Die Lösung des Rätsels der "Dialektik" muss genauso wie das der "Rationalität" im abstraktesten Sinne genommen auf demjenigen Felde gesucht werden, welches Kant, Popper und neuerdings die Theoretiker der Artificial Intelligence sich angewöhnt haben, unter dem Titel "Problemlöseverhalten" abzuhandeln.
"Ein jedes Problem besteht erstlich aus der Quästion der Aufgabe, zweitens der Auflösung, und drittens dem Beweis, dass das Verlangte durch die letztere geleistet werde." (Kant XI:322)
Denn was ist dialektische Rationalität anderes, als durch die Anwendung einer rationalen Methode, im weitesten Sinne genommen, von einer Formulierung eines Problemzustands zu einer anderen, einsichtsreicheren zu gelangen? Diese Idee auf diesem Abstraktionsniveau ist bei Hegel und Marx wie bei Popper zu identifizieren. Man kann sich aber wahrlich wacker streiten über die Formen, wie diese Idee konkret zu realisieren sei.
Doch Popper gibt uns zumindest eine Kurzargumentation. )
) "Hegel was a Platonist (or rather a Neo-Platonist) of sorts and, like Plato, a Heraclitean of sorts. He was a Platonist whose world of Ideas was changing, evolving. Plato’s ‘Forms’ or ‘Ideas’ were objective, and had nothing to do with conscious ideas in a subjective mind; they inhabitated a divine, an unchanging, heavenly world (super-lunar in Aristotle’s sense). By contrast Hegel’s Ideas, like those of Plotinus, were conscious phenomena: thoughts thinking themselves and inhabitating some kind of consciousness, some kind of mind or ‘Spirit’; and together with this ‘Spirit’ they were changing or evolving. The fact that Hegel’s ‘objective Spirit’ and ‘Absolute Spirit’ are subject to change is the only point in which his Spirits are more similar to my ‘third world’ than is Plato’s world of Ideas (or Bolzano’s world of ‘statements in themselves’). The most important differences between Hegel’s ‘Objective Spirit’ and ‘Absolute Spirit’ and my ‘third world’ are these: (1) According to Hegel, though the Objective Spirit (comprising artistic creation) and Absolute Spirit (comprising philosophy) both consist of human productions, man is not creative. It is the hypostasized Objective Spirit, it is the divine self-consciousness of the Universe, that moves man: ‘individuals ... are instruments’, instruments of the Spirit of the Epoch, and their work, their ‘substantial business’, is ‘prepared and appointed independently of them’. Thus what I have called the autonomy of the third world, and its feed-back effect, becomes with Hegel omnipotent: it is only one of the aspects of his system in which his theological background manifests itself. As against this I assert that the individual creative element, the relation of give-and-take between a man and his work, is of the greatest importance. In Hegel this degenerates into the doctrine that the great man is something like a medium in which the Spirit of The Epoch expresses itself. (2) In spite of a certain superficial similarity between Hegel’s dialectic and my evolutionary schema P1 > TT > EE > P2 there is a fundamental difference. My schema works through error-elimination, and on the scientific level through conscious criticism under the regulative idea of the search for truth. Criticism, of course, consists in the search for contradictions and in their elimination: the difficulty created by the demand for their elimination constitutes the new problem (P2). Thus the elimination of error leads to the objective growth of our knowledge - of knowledge in the objective sense. It leads to the growth of objective verisimilitude: it makes possible the approximation to (absolute) truth. Hegel, on the other hand, is a relativist. He does not see our task as the search for contradiction, with the aim of eliminating them, for he thinks that contradictions are as good as (or better than) non-contradictory theoretical systems: they provide the mechanism by which the Spirit propels itself. Thus rational criticism plays no part in the Hegelian automatism, no more than does human creativity. (3) While Plato lets his hypostasized Ideas inhabit some divine heaven, Hegel personalizes his Spirit into some divine consciousness: the Ideas inhabit it as human ideas inhabit some human consciousness. His doctrine is, throughout, that the Spirit is not only conscious, but a self. As against this, my third world has no similarity whatever to human consciousness; they are totally different from conscious ideas or from thoughts in the subjective sense." (Popper 1973a:125f)